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LABORING FOR UNITY 
By LANCE COMPA 
-n 
9.V, 
Legendary voice of unity: Clotario Brest of the CUT 
T HE HEADQUARTERS OF CHILE'S NATION-al workers command is a leaky-roofed, one-story 
converted warehouse on a side street in an aging sec-
tion of Santiago. Exposed plumbing and wiring con-
duits scar the walls and ceiling. Partitions separate 
makeshift offices. Nineteen CNT leaders pack a small 
conference room for an executive council meeting. 
Colorful posters cover the walls. Most recall events 
demanding libertad, orpaz or justicia under the ruling 
military dictatorship of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, who 
overthrew the constitutionally elected government of 
Salvador Allende in 1973. One large work commemo-
rates the one hundredth anniversary of Chicago's 
Haymarket rally and its hanged martyrs that gave rise 
to the May 1 workers' holiday. 
It is July 1987, winter in Santiago, and the leaders of 
Chile's largest labor grouping are planning two impor-
tant steps in months to come: an October 7 national 
protest strike and a 1988 founding convention for a new 
central labor body. "We have to be strong in the pro-
vinces," insists CNT president Manuel Bustos on the 
strike call. "This can't just be a Santiago action." 
Bustos is a 40-year-old textile worker and a battle-
hardened veteran of the struggle against Pinochet. He 
has spent nearly three years in prison for trade union 
and political organizing since the military coup of 
1973. Before then, Bustos was a rank and file leader in 
the giant Sumar textile mill, one of the biggest work 
sites in Chile. A Christian Democrat, he opposed the 
Communist and Socialist Party leaders of the textile 
union and many policies of Allende's Popular Unity 
coalition. Today, however, Bustos stands for unity 
with the Left, reflecting a CNT goal of rebuilding a 
broad, representative labor movement. 
F OURTEEN YEARS AFTER THE MILITARY coup the Chilean people are still seeking the road 
back to democracy. Yet finding that road requires a 
strong, democratic, united labor movement voicing the 
aspirations of working people. To achieve that goaL-
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Chilean labor leaders have to resolve- important ten-
sions in the unions' relationship to political parties, the 
role of union officials who are also committed political 
partisans and the balance between political and 
economic demands. Ironically, these are the issues that 
most troubled the labor movement under the Popular 
Unity (UP). 
Through decades of trade union struggles Chilean 
workers had succeeded in shaping a dynamic labor 
movement that played a decisive role in electing Sal-
^vadbf^Allende^irFlWOT Unions prospered^dunrTg The" 
three years of UP rule. Membership rose dramatically. 
Unions were consulted as never before on important 
government policy and on key management moves in 
newly nationalized companies. Union leaders were 
brought into state posts to administer labor-related pro-
grams. But the infusion of new members, new chal-
lenges and new responsibilities also created fresh prob-
lems that the unions were struggling to address when 
the military took over. 
T HE FRAYED STATE OF THE CNT NERVE center reflects the Chilean labor movement today, 
torn by military rule and its brutal repression. Before 
the coup, over a million workers in some ten thousand 
workplaces—more than 40% of Chile's workforce— 
belonged to the United Workers Central (CUT). Join-
ing trade unionists of differing ideologies and philoso-
phies in a single body, the CUT was perhaps unique in 
Latin America in its commitment to labor unity. 
The smashing of Chilean democracy by the military 
in 1973 carried with it—not as a byproduct of the coup 
but as a strategic objective—the destruction of or-
ganized labor and the imprisonment, torture, exile and 
murder of thousands of union activists. Today about 
400,000 workers, barely 10% of the employed work-
force—another million are effectively unemployed— 
belong to unions in fewer than 3,000 enterprises. They 
are divided among different federations and indepen-
dent labor groupings. The CNT is the largest and most 
representative, but important sections of the labor 
movement are estranged from the CNT because its 
leadership includes Communist and Socialist Party ac-
tivists. 
But the militant posters and upbeat banter among 
CNT leaders also reflect the spirit and hope that charac-
terize the movement. In this modest setting union lead-
ers plan strategies and make decisions that will go far 
to determine the fate of their country. Chile's social 
and political history—and its future—cannot be under-
stood apart from the story of trade unionism and work-
ing class consciousness. 
E XTENSIVE ORGANIZING AND MOBILIZING among Chilean laborers, especially in northern 
nitrate mines largely controlled by British capital, had 
been going on for decades when unionists created the 
Workers Federation of Chile (FOCH), the country's 
first national labor organization, in 1907. In its begin-
ning years the FOCH identified itself with the reform-
ist, middle-class dominated Democratic Party. But in 
1912 the FOCH pulled out to create the Socialist Work-
ers Party ' 'because the Democratic Party has never oc-
cupied itself with organizing the workers for the de-
fense of their economic interest" and "because the 
party in its many conventions has refused to establish a 
program of workers' economic demands."1 
After the SovieTRevolution, the Socialist Workers 
Party, like socialist groupings in many countries, be-
came the Communist Party. Union leaders were elected 
to parliament from working class areas where the Chi-
lean Workers Federation was active. Both the federa-
tion and the party grew steadily through the early 
1920s. 
In 1933 various independent Marxist groupings 
formed the Socialist Party of Chile. Some were influ-
enced by Trotsky or anarcho-syndicalists. Some were 
breakaway Communists and others on the left who 
were uncomfortable with the role of the Third Interna-
tional in party affairs. Many were intellectuals and 
middle-class youth radicalized by the experience of the 
Depression and unhappy with the Radical Party, which 
was by then the anti-clerical standard bearer of 
liberalism in Chilean political life. 
T HE SOCIALIST PARTY FIRST ORGANIZED a rival trade union federation to compete for 
worker support, splitting the movement at a time when, 
in the Depression, organizing and bargaining gains 
were few. But with the growth of Popular Front senti-
ment the split was repaired. Communists and Socialists 
formed the Confederation of Chilean Workers (CTCH) 
in 1936, though each maintained a separate faction in 
the new body. 
Economically weakened by the Depression, workers 
were forced to seek protection in the political arena. A 
Popular Front government led by the Radical Party 
with Communist and Socialist participation prevailed 
in the national elections of 1938. Important economic 
reforms were enacted, expanding social programs and 
extending state intervention in the economy. The Com-
munists and Socialists formally left the government in 
1941 but continued to vote with the majority for reform 
legislation. 
From 1938 to 1946, the tendency of organized labor 
and the two Left parties to focus their work in the legis-
lative and administrative process was reinforced. A na-
tional health service was created; a young Socialist 
deputy, Dr. Salvador AUende, was named minister of 
health. Wage and price regulations were extended. The 
sueldo vital, a minimum wage for white collar work-
ers, was instituted. Consistent with the broad range of 
forces allied against fascist Germany and Japan, a cli-
mate of widely heralded "social peace" replaced open 
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class struggle as the hallmark of Chilean political cul-
ture. 
J UST AS THE ANTI-FASCIST ALLIANCE BE-gan falling apart after the war, Chile's political con-
sensus and truce between the Communist and Socialist 
parties were violated in 1946. A labor gathering was . 
broken up by police, with five demonstrators killed. A 
general strike was called, but disagreements over 
whether to prolong it led to a new, open split between 
lhenS^iali^_a^_th^ComrnmiSts~iin;he labor move-
ment and the collapse of the CTCH. 
The 1952 presidential elections saw a substantial vic-
tory for Carlos Ibanez, a retired Army general who had 
been key in the upheaval of the late 1920s. He won on 
a populist-tinged platform with some Socialist support. 
In a poor fourth, with 5.5% of the vote, came Salvador 
Allende, candidate of a Left coalition barred by law 
from including Communists. 
In 1953 Chilean unions healed their rupture to create 
the United Workers Central (CUT). This new national 
union federation grouped Communists, Socialists, 
Radicals, Christian Democrats and other political ten-
dencies in a unitary body that held together for the next 
twenty years. While they had sharp conflicts and often 
bitter policy fights, union leaders subordinated then-
political differences to common trade union interests, 
uniting a fragmented labor movement into a central or-
ganization with a single program. 
At its founding, the CUT represented about one-
fourth of the nation's workers, virtually all Chile's 
union members. The first CUT elections resulted in 
Communist arid Socialist Party dominance, but with 
constitutionally mandated proportional representation, 
all parties were represented in the federation's leader-
ship councils. 
The CUT and the left-wing parties organized the 
Popular Action Front (FRAP) for the 1958 elections, 
and almost elected Salvador Allende president. The 
candidate of the Right, Jorge Alessandri, won with 
31.6 % of the vote. Allende followed with 29.9%. 
Eduardo Frei, on the ticket of the rapidly growing 
Christian Democratic Party, drew 20.7%, and the Rad-
ical Party candidate received 15.6%. Most Chileans 
agree that Allende would have won were it not for the 
doomed fifth candidacy of a populist priest who gar-
nered 5% of the vote. 
T HE ALESSANDRI YEARS WERE CHARAC-terized by anti-inflationary campaigns aimed at 
cutting workers' real wages. The CUT and the FRAP 
parties, especially the Socialists and Communists 
(legal again since the last days of the Ibanez regime) 
fought bitterly against this program, demanding legis-
lative guarantees of wage increases- equal to the rise in 
the cost of living. Though there were exceptional cases 
where workers made bargaining gains, most workers 
and their unions again found themselves dependent on 
the political parties rather than their own organizing 
and bargaining resources for economic protection. 
In the 1964 elections Allende clearly would have 
won another three-way contest. Fearing this result, the 
Right threw its support to Eduardo Frei in a two-man 
race. Frei won with 56% of the vote, to Allende's 39%. 
The Frei regime began with broad support and high 
hopes, even among workers who had supported 
Allende and the FRAP coalition of Left parties. Frei 
campaigned on a reformist platform stressing justice 
and land redistribution. But early in his -rule eight cop-
per miners were killed and forty injured in what labor' 
saw as a strike-breaking massacre. 
The Army's move against striking miners took on 
added significance because of copper's historical im-
portance. Nearly all of Chile's foreign trade, and much 
of its domestic economy, depended on the copper in-
dustry. And miners were viewed as the "shock troops" 
of Chilean labor, much like U.S. coal miners in the 
early 20th century. Geographically isolated, they took 
on some attitudes of a labor elite, yet knew that Chilean 
workers looked to them and their union for leadership. 
In dispatching troops against the miners, Frei sent the 
labor movement a sharp, hostile message. 
Later Frei measures, including forced savings and 
anti-inflationary steps like those of Alessandri, further 
embittered the unions. Within the Christian Democrat-
ic party itself, young leadership became increasingly 
disillusioned with the president's performance. In 1968 
much of the party's progressive youth split off to form 
the United People's Action Movement (MAPU). 
During the Frei regime the Communist Party and the 
Socialists who followed Allende argued for a shift in 
the Left's political strategy. Rather than an exclusively 
Left, working class coalition like the FRAP, they 
called for a broader grouping that would include pro-
gressives among the middle class and disaffected small 
business people. Their reasoning found converts: in 
late 1969 the two big Left parties, the MAPU, some in-
dependent socialists and a majority within the Radical 
Party formed the Popular Unity coalition (UP) to con-
front the 1970 elections. 
T HE UP FORMULATED A PROGRAM THAT aimed to create conditions for a transition to 
socialism while respecting Chile's constitution. The 
program called for "the transfer of power from the old 
dominant groups to the workers, the peasants and the 
progressive sectors of the middle classes of the city and 
the countryside."2 
The core of the UP economic program was creation 
of an Area Social or state sector including natural re-
sources, banks and major manufacturing enterprises, 
especially the enormously important copper industry. 
The UP issued a list of 91 companies targeted for full 
or partial nationalization. Together, Las 91, out of 
MARCH/APRIL'1988 23 
Chile 
more than 35,000 business establishments in Chile, 
produced 60% of the country's gross national product. 
Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democrats' choice 
in the 1970 elections, presented a platform similar in 
many respects to that of the UP, including extensive 
nationalization. Memories of Frei's broken promises, 
however, eroded his credibility. Judging they could 
now win a three-way race, the Right again offered 
Jorge Alessandri, the ex-president who ran on an 
openly authoritarian program. 
Alletrde_a~nth:he^^ 
36.2% of the vote, narrowly ahead of Alessandri's 
34.9%. Tomic was third with 27.8%. Conservative 
forces had won in 1958; the middle-of-the-roaders had 
their chance in 1964. Now it was the socialists' turn. 
L IKE THE TWO THAT PRECEDED IT, the UP was a minority government, but hardly im-
potent. The constitution provided for a strong execu-
tive. The Christian Democrats and the Right held a 
majority in Congress, but not the two-thirds needed to 
override a presidential veto. Earlier presidents had 
been granted powers of "intervention" and "requisi-
tion" of mismanaged or strategically important enter-
prises. Now, Allende's veto power could block any 
legislative move to deny him the same power to take 
control of the 91 companies targeted for nationaliza-
tion. 
But the government had to develop strategies for 
1973 mid-term congressional elections. A loss of just 
over 3% of its 1970 vote meant the UP would lose its 
protection against a veto override, while a two-thirds 
majority for the opposition would allow it to roll back 
reforms. To carry out its program, the UP had to hold 
oh to its sources of voting strength. 
The Popular Unity owed much to the CUT for its 
1970 victory. While the Left coalition obtained just 
over one-third of the overall vote, some two-thirds of 
the CUT's rank and file members voted for Allende.3 
Looking ahead to 1973, CUT mobilization would be 
decisive in holding the UP's margin over the congres-
sional opposition. • 
L IKE ANY COALITION OF PARTIES WITH strongly held views, the UP was troubled by inter-
nal differences. The Communist Party urged a slow, 
step-by-step reform process rather than precipitous 
socialization, and attacked "ultra Left" groups outside . 
the UP—mainly the Revolutionary Left Movement 
(MIR)—that pushed for immediate action. In contrast 
to the disciplined Communists, Socialist Party activists 
were divided. Its right wing, identified with President 
Allende, was closest to the Communist position. Other 
Socialist factions, however, developed close ties to the 
MIR and other groupings that criticized the UP from 
the left. The Radical Party and MAPU developed a mix 
of policies that put them to the left of the Communists 
on questions of nationalization, but stressed worker 
participation in management and other themes that re-
sonated in their own middle-class bases. 
Communists and Socialists held most CUT leader-
ship posts. In 1968 the Communist slate won 46% of 
the vote in CUT national balloting. Socialist unionists 
won 22%, Christian Democrats 10% and Radicals 8%. 
Luis Figueroa, a longtime Communist Party and union 
leader, was CUT president when the UP came to 
power. 
eUTTinion"leadersT:eflected"theii-party-differences_ 
despite the federation's unitary program. The relatively 
restrained positions of the Communists and the Allende 
socialists in the CUT opened them to attacks from the 
MER. and the left Socialists for betraying their promises 
of revolutionary change. Meanwhile, the Christian 
Democrats were the third largest force in the CUT, and 
also the majority opposition party. Holding the union 
movement together under these circumstances would 
test the maturity of Chile's workers and the commnV 
ment to unity of their leaders. How would the labor 
movement now balance its trade union activities and its 
political role under the "workers government'-' it had 
put into office? 
T ENSIONS IN THE RULING COALITION AND among its union supporters resulted in mixed, 
sometimes contradictory policies in government and 
the labor federation. On one hand, enforcement of 
labor laws boosted unions' institutional interest in or-
ganizing the unorganized, building industry-wide.bar-
gaining structures and pushing hard for gains at the 
negotiating table and on the picket line. On the other 
hand, the government, often supported by CUT lead-
ers, called for restraint and sacrifice by workers in for-
mulating and bargaining for their economic demands, 
especially in the nationalized Area Social. 
The total number of workplace unions and union 
members practically doubled between 1970 and 1973, 
a burst of organizing reminiscent of 1930s CIO union 
organizing in the United States under the New Deal. 
There were 4,000 local unions in 1970 and 10,000 by 
1973. 600,000 workers belonged to unions in 1970; 
three years later 1.1 million were unionized. The 
number of strikes doubled, too, from 1,800 in 1970 to 
some 4,000 in 1973.4 
W HERE EARLIER ADMINISTRATIONS 
made workers run an obstacle course of paper-
filing and formalities to form a union, Allende's Minis-
try of Labor rapidly approved organizing requests. 
' 'Even the Frei people sided with employers who re-
sisted union organization," said a ministry staffer who 
reviewed union organizing petitions under the UP. 
' 'My job is to call up the boss to tell him 'You've got a 
union now.' "5 
In place of a system of plant-by-plant bargaining that 
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retarded industrial unionism and weakened workers' 
bargaining power, the UP promoted industry-wide bar-
gaining "commissions" to negotiate standard -wages 
and benefits for entire sectors of industry. Sectoral bar-
gaining raised wages for lower paid workers. Since it 
carried with it automatic union representation in for-
merly unrepresented workplaces, union membership 
jumped in sectors with industry-wide bargaining. 
In the Area Social the UP was the employer, often 
through an "intervention" prompted by a strike de-
manding a government takeover and expulsion of the 
company owners. In theory, as a UP representative on 
the management team of a nationalized textile firm ar-
gued: 
We cannot analyze the functioning of these firms 
in traditional capitalist terms. We are not worried 
about the individual case of each firm, but rather 
A generation that has known only dictatorship 
the global, context of the textile area. Some firms 
suffer losses but are compensated by the enor- . 
mous gains of others. We are not interested in 
profiting, but in serving the entire community.6 . 
But what if the workers in profitable firms—and un-
profitable ones, too, for that matter—demanded more 
for themselves than for the community? In a speech to 
a CUT rally in July 1972, President Allende insisted 
"It is imperative to put a stop to the unreasonable de-
mands for wage: increases . . . We must_risft-ahnve_rhfv 
criteria of the past. . . It is indispensable to link wage 
increases to production and productivity . . . We can-
not have new demands after a settlement is 
reached. ... . " 7 . 
S IMILAR CALLS FOR "DISCIPLINE" AND "restraint" marked public declarations of other 
UP government leaders and CUT officials. But inside 
the. unions, sharp debates took place. Left-wing 
Socialists and MAPUcistas—UP party members— 
joined critics from the Revolutionary Left Movement 
(MIR) and the Christian Democratic Party in attacking 
the Communists and Allende Socialists for betraying 
the workers they were supposed to defend. In turn, the 
two dominant parties agonized over which course of 
action to take: attacking the Left groupings and the 
Christian Democrats as "wreckers," or disarming 
them by taking the lead in "making new economic de-
mands. "I wish I were still a union negotiator in the 
private sector,'' said one Communist textile union offi-
cial in the Area Social. ' 'There the boss was the class 
enemy. Here the boss is a party comrade."8 
Communist Party unionists were especially troubled 
by the conflicting demands of labor partisanship and 
government policies of restraint. The party's theoreti-
cal journal contained articles asserting, on one hand, 
that "a policy of senseless expropriations, of indiffer-
ence to the lack of labor discipline and considerations 
of productivity, and of pushing opportunistic wage de-
mands, is to give ammunition to the enemy," and on 
the other hand arguing that "Workers should not be 
prevented from trying to get wage increases from a 
state that appears to them as the successor of the old 
boss. . . : Without falling into opportunism, Com-
munists should support the workers' wage demands. " 9 
CUT leaders ended up trying to take both positions, 
never reconciling their dilemma. There was accord on 
generalities: unions should be "the orienting motor and 
conductor of the working class" and "the nerve of 
agitation on political problems."10 But on the ground, 
events like a joint Left-Right occupation of the Econo-
my Ministry in October 1972 by Miristas and Christian 
Democrats demanding wage increases above what their 
Communist and Socialist union leaders were seeking' 
starkly exposed the divisions in the labor movement. 
The decades-old dependence of the trade unions on 
the Left political parties for defense.of workers' 
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economic interests could not be quickly ended. Union 
leaders had always told their members to vote' Com-
munist and Socialist to defend and advance their stan-
dard of living through legislative means. Now that 
workers' parties were in government, union members 
understandably expected delivery on old promises of a 
better life. Many were disillusioned by the calls for 
sacrifice from CUT and UP leaders. 
T HE' 1972 CUT NATIONAL ELECTIONS DEM-onstrated the problems faced by established union 
leadership. From their 1968 total of 46% of the vote, 
the Communist slate fell to 31%. Allende Socialists 
gained ground, reflecting the president's popularity, 
from 22% in 1968 to 26% in 1972. But Christian Dem-
ocrats nearly tripled their representation, going from 
10% in 1968 to more than 26% in the 1972 balloting. 
The rise in Christian Democratic strength in the labor 
movement increased opposition confidence that it 
could win two-thirds of the congressional seats needed 
to overturn the UP program in the 1973 mid-term par-
liamentary elections. But Chilean.workers exhibited 
their class loyalties and support for a widened program 
of social services in poor working class and campesino 
communities. A massive registration and get-out-the-
vote drive helped Allende's coalition win an astonish-
ing 44% of the vote. 
It was the first time a sitting government actually 
gained seats in mid-term congressional elections. In-
deed, the 1973 contest was really a greater electoral 
triumph for the coalition than winning the presidency 
in 1970, considering the forces arrayed against the gov-
ernment and the fierce opposition campaign. But the 
UP advance in March 1973 also forced the hand of 
coup planners, since it blocked their "constitutional" 
road to reverse the UP program. In appearance, the 
constitutional road to socialism had won three more 
years. In fact, Allende and the Popular Unity had six 
months to live. 
C HILEAN WORKERS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN pulled toward opposite poles. One is a national 
trade unionism in which working class conditions are a 
question requiring country-wide solutions. But at the 
same time, workers often identify with their employer 
and workplace as the locus of struggle. 
Through most of this century, national, class-based 
unionism has prevailed. One reason is cultural: Chi-
leans' self-image is strongly homogenous. The near-
destruction of Indian culture left hegemony to the 
Spanish heritage, In addition, the waves of immigrants 
who rolled ashore on the east coast of the continent 
rarely crossed the Andes. Stretched between the moun-
tains and the sea, Chile is like an island whose people 
see themselves as one. • • ' 
At the same time Chileans are highly attuned to the 
notion of struggle between classes. The country's 
economic history is key: development was based 
mainly on the exploitation of mineral resources—coal 
and nitrate in the. last century; coal, copper and oil in 
this century. Mines are spread the entire length of 
Chile; to take a U.S. analogy it is as if the Appalachian 
coal range were one country, with its history of militant 
unionism and "us-versus-them" attitudes .toward 
mineowners. In Chile, this brand of working class sen-
timent radiated outward over the decades through the 
railroads and ports that shipped mineral products, and 
into the factories where miners and their children found 
work after pits were exhausted. It even found its way 
into teaching, public employment and professions 
where the gifted children of working class families 
found careers. 
Under these forces a "national," class struggle-
oriented unionism has held sway in the Chilean labor 
movement throughout this century. But it has always 
had to contend with a rival tradition of paternalism on 
the part of many employers and corresponding worker 
subservience, and an identification with the individual 
workplace or firm as the place where workers' im-
mediate problems of wages, hours and working condi-
tions are resolved. 
T HE MILITARY COUP OP 1973 DESTROYED the structure of Chile's national, class-based un-
ionism. Pinochet quickly dissolved the CUT and liq-
uidated its assets on the grounds that it was a subver-
sive Marxist-Leninist political body, not a labor or-
ganization. Hundreds of union leaders were jailed, 
killed or exiled in the months following the coup. 
But the military left in place many workplace-level 
unions and local leaders, not seen as militants or UP 
party activists. In line with its proclaimed break with 
socialism and move to a liberalized economy, the mili-
tary aimed to create a new, atomized movement based 
on enterprise-conscious "company" unionism. The 
new movement would be apolitical, confining ac-
tivities to collective bargaining. It would also be a mar-
ket unionism, where workers in each enterprise would 
tailor their demands and contract settlements to the pro-. 
friability of the individual employer rather than seek in-
dustry-wide standards. 
On September 18, 1973 the new military junta issued 
a proclamation calling for the firing of workers consid-
ered "activists," "saboteurs" or "criminals." Collec-
tive bargaining was banned and agreements still in ef- : 
feet were voided. The right to strike was abolished. 
Union meetings after working hours were forbidden. 
For nearly six years after the coup, unions were pro-1 
hibited from any form of political activity. A meeting's f 
place, time and agenda had to be delivered in writing to ; 
the police two days in advance. Military governors :; 
could "remove union officers deemed "unsuitable."•% 
Office vacancies had to be filled by the next seniors 
member, not by election." • • * 
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D ESPITE SUCH RESTRICTIONS, LABOR Ac-tivists fought their way back toward their tradi-
tional national-level unionism— not, however, without 
new tensions and divisions. Only months after the 
coup, labor cadres from the UP parties began meeting 
as a "clandestine CUT" in a Catholic Church-spon-
sored education program. At the same time longshore 
union head Eduardo Rios led labor leaders who had op-
posed the Allende coalition in dealing with the military 
authorities and supporting Pinochet's economic poli-
cies. These unionists, mostly Christian Democrats, ex-
pected a rapid return to normalcy under their party's 
rule once "the Left" was wiped out. When it became 
clear Pinochet was not going to hand over power to the 
'Christian Democrats, however, this "Group of Ten" 
union federation leaders joined the opposition to the 
junta. 
"The Ten" became the public face of Chilean or-
ganized labor in the years immediately after the coup. 
But behind the scenes, former CUT and UP activists 
were coordinating new organizing moves. Progressives 
among The Ten began working with them, leading to 
their expulsion on charges of collaborating with Com-
munists. In 1976 anew union grouping took shape: the 
National Union Coordinating Body (CNS) expressed 
the work of former CUT activists and the expelled 
leaders of the Group of Ten. 
By the end of 1976 two distinct union bodies with di-
vergent political perspectives were operating, often 
competitively. The Group of Ten, led by formerly anti-
UP Christian Democrats, was based in the maritime 
unions, public employee unions and agricultural work-
ers' organizations. Influenced and financed by the 
United States' AFL-CIO, the Group of Ten rejected 
any cooperation with Marxist unionists from the CUT 
or the UP parties. While it maintained a "national" 
line opposing government efforts to promote enterprise 
unionism, the Group of Ten rejected class struggle and 
a strategy of mass mobilization, calling instead for an 
orderly return to democracy in which a relatively 
apolitical labor movement could conduct its trade 
union business without government or party influence. 
A LTERNATIVELY, CNS LEADERS WERE left Christian Democrats and former CUT and 
Popular Unity activists who agreed on the need to work 
•together. The CNS had a broader base in industry than 
the Group of Ten, especially in blue-collar private em-
ployment including textile, metal and construction 
workers and miners from small and medium-sized cop-
per and coal mines. It also had a strong, though minor-
ity, base among campesino organizations. 
The CNS did not include copper miners in La Gran 
Mineria, the half-dozen giant copper mines that ac-
counted for most of the country's output of that key 
mineral. Those workers belonged to the independent 
Copper Workers Federation (CTC), where the Pinochet 
dictatorship had installed pro-government leaders in 
months following the coup. The main copper mines are 
far from other sectors of industry and trade unionism. 
The government-chosen leadership promoted an 
isolationist line, arguing that copper workers were bet-
ter paid than others and Should not mix with the rest of 
the labor movement. 
The attempt to co-opt the copper workers and their 
union failed. Rank and file activists who opposed the 
_goxemment_Qut-organizedJheir_puppetJleadership_ancL. 
began winning elections to successively higher union 
posts. In November 1977 workers pulled off a nearly 
total strike in the giant El Teniente mine. Seventy 
workers were fired and four union leaders were sent 
into exile, but the strike galvanized the rest of the labor 
movement. 
The Group of Ten and the CNS held a joint May 1 
rally in 1978 calling for increased union freedoms and 
economic justice. Strikes broke out in other industries. 
Though most did not win immediate gains, they re-
flected increasing impatience and boldness by rank and 
file. 
I N MID-1978 COPPER MINERS AT THE CHU-quicamata pit launched a new tactic. Barred from 
striking by government decree, they initiated "eat-
ins." These lunch-time protests called for wage in-
creases—and delayed a return to work after lunch. 
Alarmed by growing labor militancy, the dictatorship 
struck back in October. Seven key federations of the 
CNS and a number of local public sector unions were 
dissolved by decrees and new union organizing in state 
enterprises was barred. Police seized dozens of leaders 
in all sectors—CNS and Group of Ten officials and 
heads of unions in independent groupings like the 
FUT, a small federation linked to the Latin American 
Christian Democratic labor organization, CLAT, aiid 
the CEPCH, Chile's major union of white-collar em-
ployees in private employment.'2 
The unions responded with an urgent, united call for 
international support. The AFL-CIO and European 
union federations threatened to boycott Chilean com-
merce. Faced with such action, the government re-
lented, releasing most detainees and revoking most of 
the October decrees. Instead, the junta decided to for-
mulate a new labor policy that would, in its view, 
create "the bases of a democratic labor union move-
ment.'"3 
T HE PINOCHET DICTATORSHIP TOUTED ITS 1979 Plan Laboral as a modernization of labor re-
lations that would win wide union support. But the 
plan's policing of internal union affairs, prohibitions 
on collective bargaining above the single-plant level, 
sixty-day strike limit and ban on strikes in govemment-
seiected strategic enterprises united all unions against 
the new labor regime. The Group of Ten, the CNS, the 
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FUT, CEPCH—even breakaway elements of the gov-
ernment-sponsored union body—formed a new Com-
mand for Defense of Trade Union Rights to fight the 
Labor Plan. 
Union opposition notwithstanding, the Pinochet gov-
ernment imposed the Labor Plan with minimal 
changes. Four years of what was in effect labor "guer-
rilla warfare" ensued,.with selective work stoppages, 
protest rallies and new organizing efforts. Continued 
progress by anti-government forces in the copper mines 
led to an April 1983 one-day national strike against 
government labor policies. The call by Chile's labor 
"shock troops" seized the country's imagination. In-
stead of just a show of strength by workers, plans were 
laid for successive "days of national protest" involv-
ing all sections of the political opposition. 
To coordinate the new, widened actions, the unions . 
in the Command for Defense created a new National 
Workers Command (CNT) that included, at the outset, 
the Copper Workers, the CNS, the Group of Ten (now 
called the Democratic Workers Union, UDT), FUT, 
CEPCH and several independent unions. For a brief 
time the National Command was as broad a labor 
grouping as the CUT had been in earlier times. But old 
tensions soon resurfaced. Within a year of the CNT's 
creation, the UDT left it to form its own Democratic 
Workers Confederation (CDT). It was not a clean 
break, however: the important oil workers union and 
key independent unions in the banking sector and the 
shoe and leather industry quit the CDT to remain with 
the CNT, now seen as the principal advocate of labor 
unity and continued social mobilization against the dic-
tatorship. 
By now a young Christian Democrat named Rodolfo 
Seguel had rocketed to the top leadership post of the 
Copper Workers Union and the CNT. Seguel led mas-
sive strikes and protests throughout 1984, 1985 and 
1986. When the more experienced and at first more 
recognized Manuel Bustos returned from another 
period of exile in 1984, he conceded that "Today 
Seguel is in charge and I'm part of his team. He stood 
up when it was needed, and that gives him the authority 
to lead the labor movement."l4 
F OR A TIME DURING THE 1983-1985 PRO-
' tests the future of the Pinochet government was 
called into question. But hopes for a rapid evolution to 
democracy evaporated by the end of 1986. A sharp 
sense of discouragement took hold among rank and file 
workers and the population at large, exhausted by what 
seemed a permanent state of mobilization with nothing 
to show for it. Pinochet appeared unwilling to budge. 
The discovery of a large guerrilla arms cache in a re-
mote northern site in August 1986 frightened the mod-
erate opposition and strengthened Pinochet's "It's me 
or chaos" card. Then, a failed assassination attempt in 
September brought a new sense of despair: first by the 
botched results, second by the widespread belief that 
greater repression than 1973 would have followed" the' 
death of Pinochet, sure to be replaced by another gen-
eral. Perhaps worst of all, many Chileans felt that the 
opposition was unprepared to govern a restored democ-
racy. 
Immediate prospects for the Chilean opposition, in-
cluding the labor movement, are not promising. Three 
years of social mobilization shook the regime but failed 
to break it. The October 7, 1987 national strike was a 
limited success, effective mainly m Santiago. The gov-
ernment said bombings on the eve of the strike had kept 
people from reporting for work. CNT leaders counT 
tered that the explosions could have been designed to 
discredit the strike and divert attention from its de-
mands. 
I F THERE IS HOPE FOR A REUNIFIED LABOR movement in Chile, it rests on what is now a con-
sensus in the CNT that trade unionists should not be too 
dependent on political parties, too controlled by party 
labor commissions or too unwilling to work with the 
entire political spectrum within the labor movement. 
Two years after the coup d'etat, CUT president Luis 
Figueroa, at a meeting of union leaders in exile in Lon-
don, conceded that "We made a mistake getting too 
close to the ^ government . . . The Christian Democrats 
supported trie, coup because we didn't know how to 
work' with them in the unions . . . . We cannot avoid re-
sponsibility.'We didn't know how to maintain our in-
dependence . . . Loyalty to your party is one thing, ah 
instrument of class unity is something else.'"5 
The CNT is planning a founding convention of a new 
labor central in late 1988. Most analysts agree it will 
consist largely of current CNT unions without the par-
ticipation of the CDT. Current plans are to call the new 
body the Unified Workers Central (CUT), evoking the 
historic significance of the "CUT" and implying a 
labor movement still based on principles of class strug-
gle. "The name is not important," says Manuel Bus-
tos. "It's the principles and program that count."16 
Unfortunately the CDT rejects the principles and 
program implied in recreating the CUT. The two 
groups might collaborate on events like May 1 protests 
and calls for a return to democracy or respect for labor 
rights. But these unifying themes are countered by con-
tinuing divisions. Should the Christian Democrats 
cooperate with Marxists? What is the proper mix of 
bread and butter union demands and wider political de-
mands? Can the CDT port workers' interest in ex-
panded imports, which means jobs for themselves, be 
reconciled with CNT industrial workers' calls for pro-
tection of the internal market to save their members' 
jobs? Until Chilean trade unionists again put common . 
interests ahead of such differences, the labor move-
ment will be unable to lead the Chilean resistance in a 
return to democracy. M 
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have infected both sides of the aisle. Liberal and con-
servative members of Congress alike are proud of the 
last two years of dictator-toppling. First Marcos, then 
Baby Doc; now Gen. Noriega's days are numbered. 
But the bipartisan attack on Panama in the last few 
months has brought the art of rhetoric, destabilization 
and meddling to new heights, as even progressive and 
liberal political leaders join the chorus. Sen. John 
Kerry's groundbreaking hearings on drug running 
jAghtfully_trace.d_the_teaffic_ through Panama, onlvtobe^ 
transformed into a pep rally for Noriega's ouster. 
That Panama, especially, should stick in 
Washington's craw is perhaps understandable. It was, 
after all, the Panama of Omar Torrijos which success-
fully forged a solid regional consensus behind Panama-
nian dominion over the canal. It is that consensus— 
growing Latin American unity expressed in multilateral 
diplomatic initiatives such as the Cartagena debtors, 
Contadora and Esquipulas—that threatens U.S. domi-
nance more than any drug-dealing dictator or progres-
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sive polity. The Esquipulas peace process—Central 
Americans solving Central American problems—fun-
damentally challenges the Monroe Doctrine at a time 
when even longtime friends such as Gen. Pinochet are 
accusing Washington of imperialistic meddling. It 
seems the terms of Congress' bipartisan consensus are 
an acceptance of intervention. The debate turns on 
whether Washington is using its considerable leverage 
for good or evil, not on whether it should unilaterally 
seek to determine the course of events in other nations. 
Martin Andersen, who recently jolned~rnlTNffionaT 
Democratic Institute, says that "As in the watershed 
year 1973, Chile's prospects for democracy are, once 
again, in many respects ours to lose."77 Does that 
imply a replay of 1973? "Chileans have got to solve it 
themselves," concluded one longtime observer. 
'.'Even though we mucked it up in 1973, that doesn't 
mean we should go down and muck it up again, even if 
some Chilean leaders are coming up here and asking 
for help." • 
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